A Tables for Austrian Election Study
have to slightly adjust the utility specification of our models, as the survey did not ask respondents about their rating of this coalition. We adjust the utility specification in a way that we are able to use the rating of the coalition partner to estimate the mixing parameter. While for the utility specification of the SPÖ we include the FPÖ rating in the coalition component, for the utility specification of the FPÖ we include the SPÖ rating in the coalition component. The following shows why this specification still allows us to infer about an increase or decrease in reliance on coalition characteristics.
Suppose that every respondent i's coalition rating can be expressed as a weighted combination of the respective coalition partners rating scores. For a coalition of two parties this means that the coalition rating C i can be expressed as:
where P ij is the rating of the party j and CP ij is the rating of the respective coalition partner of party j. w is a weight bounded between 0 and 1. Instead of estimating
, 2}, the mixture between party and coalition ratings, we can substitute in C i from the above equation. This allows us to get the utility in terms of party j's rating and the rating of its respective coalition partner:
k and γ k are linear transformations of one another and therefore measured on different scales.
Assuming that w does not change across both decision because coalition ratings are a pre-treatment characteristic, and that w = 1 (otherwise this would imply that γ * = 1, i.e., coalition preferences do not matter at all, which previous research has shown to be false) one can show that
Thus, even if we have to use the coalition partner rating instead of the coalition rating and find that γ * 1 − γ * 2 > 0, we can conclude that γ 1 − γ 2 > 0 if we could have measured it, i.e., that voters rely more on coalition considerations in their decision calculus when being primed by such coalition signal.
E Statistical Model to Estimate the Effect of Coalition
Vignettes for Three-party Coalitions
Two of the coalition vignettes in the GLES refer to three party coalitions.
In order to make use of vignettes of three-party coalitions we straightforwardly extend our model to 4 × 4 choices to account for a larger choice-set. Each respondent could report an intention to vote for one of the three parties in such a coalition or, as before, do something else. In the following we describe how this changes our model.
The larger choice-set now consists of four choices, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. Choice options '1'
to '3' refer to the three different parties in such a coalition, and j = '4' indicates, as before, respondents intending to vote for any other party on the ballot, not voting at all, or providing a "don't know" answer. This yields 4 × 4 transition probabilities with 16 outcomes.
y 2 = 1 y 2 = 2 y 2 = 3 y 2 = 4 y While neither the utility specification nor the derivation of the probabilities change in this model, the increased choice set results in a different model for these transition probabilities.
where there are four utility specifications. To identify this model we set V 1 i4 and V 2 i4
to potion of neither intending to vote for any of the parties equal to zero. Again using the same independent variables as before we estimate the joined probability distribution pr(Θ|P ij , C i , Z ij , X i , y 1j ) of the parameters given the data where the likelihood is: 
F Control Variables
In our model specifications we include controls for party identification, left-right distance, age, gender (i.e., female), education, religion (i.e., catholic), union membership and income. In this appendix we briefly discuss operationalization of these concepts.
In the Austrian Pre-Election Study the variables are coded from the following questions:
• The survey question regarding 'Party Identification' in the Austrian Pre-Election Study reads: In Austria many people tend towards a political party, although they sometimes vote for another party. How is that with you? Do you tend towards a specific party? If so, which one? Consequently, we code PID = '1' if a respondent identifies with a specific party and a zero otherwise.
• We created perceived policy distance to a party from a common 11-point left right scale. Respondents where asked to place themselves and all respective parties on the scale. Based on this we created negative quadratic distance as measurement of a respondents distance to each respective party.
• The respondent's age and gender (1 = 'female') were asked at the beginning of the survey.
• It was asked for a respondent's education using a categorical scale ranging from (1)
Hauptschule to (7) university degree.
• Respondent's were asked about their religion. They were able to choose between "Catholic", "Protestant", and "Other". In our models we include a dummy for catholic respondents.
• For union membership we include a dummy wether the respondent or one of the household members is member of a union.
• Income was measured on an increasing categorical scale ranging from (1) less than 500 Euro to (8) more than 5.000 Euro, in 50 Euro steps.
The conceptualizations in the GLES is very similar:
• The survey question for 'Party Identification' in the GLES is the same than in Austria: In Germany many people tend towards a political party, although they sometimes vote for another party. How is that with you? Do you tend towards a specific party? If so, which one? As before, we code PID = '1' if a respondent identifies with a specific party and a zero otherwise.
• The GLES includes the same question regarding left-right positions of respondents and parties than in the Austrian Election study. We employ perceived quadratic-distance on the 11 point let-right scale to each party as a measurement of policydistance.
• The respondent's age and gender were also asked at the beginning of the survey.
• Respondent's were asked about their last degree. Ranging from (1) Abitur to (4) no degree.
• Respondent's were able to choose among "Catholic", "Evangelic -Protestant", "Evangelic -congregational chapel", "other christian confessions", "Jewish", "Muslim"or other. Again, we include a dummy include a dummy for catholic respondents.
• A survey-question asked if a respondent is part of a specific organization. We include a dummy if a respondent indicates being a member of a union.
we include a dummy wether the respondent or one of the household members is member of a union.
• Income was as well measured on an increasing categorical scale ranging from (1) less than 500 Euro to (11) more than 5.000 Euro.
G Robustness Check: Unobserved confounders
We checked the robustness of our results against unobserved confounders by running each Model five times on a randomly constructed three quarter subset of the respective datasets. For each of the models this yields five varying estimates of the first difference (γ 1 − γ 2 ) between weight put on party vs. coalition considerations in the normal and vignette decision. The logic of this robustness check is straightforward: If the estimates confirm the increase of coalition considerations for each of the subsets, we can be confident that our results are not driven by a subset within the dataset. Additionally, we might combine our estimates to an overarching estimate applying techniques from multiple imputation (?, p.53). This method takes into account variation over the estimates and uncertainty within each estimation. The results of our main analysis are mostly robust over the different subsets. For three out of four two party coalitions we find the combined 95 % confidence intervals to exclude zero. Figure 2 shows the results for the Austrian Election Study and Figure 3 for the German longitudinal election study. For the Austrian Election study the estimates are generally above zero, confirming the robustness of our results. For the German Election study we find similar support for the CDU-Greens party-coalitions, but not for three-party-coalitions and the SPD-FDP coalition. In these three cases the 95% confidence intervals include zero. Still, all five median estimates are above zero rather supporting our priming argument than rejecting it all together. Especially, since in some of the subsets we find indication of increased coalition considerations in respondents intended voting decisions. 
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